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Nearly 60 years ago, Jerome L. Singer launched a groundbreaking research program into
daydreaming (Singer, 1955, 1975, 2009) that presaged and laid the foundation for virtually
everymajor strand of mindwandering research active today (Antrobus, 1999; Klinger, 1999,
2009). Herewe review Singer’s enormous contribution to the ﬁeld, which includes insights,
methodologies, and tools still in use today, and trace his enduring legacy as revealed in
the recent proliferation of mind wandering studies. We then turn to the central theme
in Singer’s work, the adaptive nature of positive constructive daydreaming, which was a
revolutionary idea when Singer began his work in the 1950s and remains underreported
today. Last, we propose a new approach to answering the enduring question: Why does
mind wandering persist and occupy so much of our time, as much as 50% of our waking
time according to some estimates, if it is as costly as most studies suggest?
Keywords: daydreaming, positive constructive daydreaming, volitional daydreaming, mind wandering, Jerome L.
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INTRODUCTION
Over the past 60 years, researchers have assigned various names
to the thoughts and images that arise when attention drifts away
from external tasks and perceptual input toward a more private,
internal stream of consciousness. The list includes daydreaming,
thought intrusions, task irrelevant thoughts, spontaneous thought
or cognition, stimulus independent thought, respondent thought,
fantasy, taskunrelated thought, taskunrelated images and thought,
internally generated thoughts, self-generated thought, absent-
mindedness, zoning out, ofﬂine thought, undirected thought,
unconscious thought, and mind wandering. This proliferation
of terminology has obscured the common features of the phe-
nomena under discussion and made it more difﬁcult for current
researchers to connect their work with the work of scholars who
trod similar paths before them (Christoff, 2012).
Though mind wandering is the term most commonly used by
cognitive researchers today, Singer’s preferred term is daydream-
ing. In his work, Singer differentiated between three styles of
daydreaming: positive constructive daydreaming, characterized by
playful, wishful imagery, and planful, creative thought; guilty-
dysphoric daydreaming, characterized by obsessive, anguished fan-
tasies; and poor attentional control, characterized by the inability
to concentrate on either the ongoing thought or the external task
(Singer, 1975). The three daydreaming styles Singer and colleagues
identiﬁed are reﬂected in three major strands of mind wandering
research active today: mind wandering as adaptive and beneﬁcial,
the relationship between mind wandering, especially rumination,
andmood, andmindwandering as cognitive failure related to poor
attentional control (Mooneyham and Schooler, 2013).
In this paper, we will conﬁne ourselves to Singer’s original term,
daydreaming, or the more commonly used term in recent studies,
mind wandering, unless we are speciﬁcally referring to a more
limited term used in a particular study. For the sake of clarity,
we use Singer’s term, positive constructive daydreaming, when
referring to the personally beneﬁcial aspects of tuning into the
internally generated content.
BRIEF HISTORY
Singer’s investigations of daydreaming and imagination were
already well established when his ﬁrst doctoral student, John S.
Antrobus, arrived at Teachers College, Columbia University in
1959 (Singer, 1975, 2009; Antrobus, 1999). By the time Singer and
Antrobus published their ﬁrst joint paper (Singer and Antrobus,
1963), Singer had already published eight papers directly dis-
cussing imagination, fantasy, and daydreaming (Singer, 1955,
1961; McCraven et al., 1956; Singer and Opler, 1956; Singer and
McCraven, 1961, 1962; Singer and Schonbar, 1961; Singer and
Rowe, 1962) and several more that touched on the same topics
indirectly. Singer reported much of this early research, presenting
a powerful argument for the adaptive role of daydreaming, in his
seminal book“Daydreaming:An Introduction to the Experimental
Study of Inner Experience” (Singer, 1966).
Over the next two decades, Singer and Antrobus enjoyed an
enormously fruitful collaboration that produced key insights and
developed or adapted to the study of thought ﬂow tools and
methodologies that are still in use today including The imagi-
nal processes inventory (IPI; Singer and Antrobus, 1966; Antrobus
et al., 1970) and short imaginal processes inventory (SIPI; Huba
et al., 1981; Huba and Tanaka, 1983), signal detection (Antrobus
et al., 1964; Singer, 1964a, 1975; Antrobus et al., 1966, 1967, 1970),
an early precursor of thought sampling both in the laboratory
(Singer and Antrobus, 1963) and out (Klos and Singer, 1981),
which was retrospective rather than instantaneous as in later ver-
sions (Klinger et al., 1976; Csikszentmihalyi et al., 1977; Klinger,
1978; Hurlburt, 1979; Csikszentmihalyi and Graef, 1980; Prescott
andCsikszentmihalyi, 1981; Csikszentmihalyi and Figurski, 1982);
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ocular motility (Antrobus et al., 1964; Singer and Antrobus, 1965;
Singer et al., 1971), and attention decoupling (Antrobus et al., 1966,
1970; Singer, 1966; Antrobus, 1968).
At a time when most American psychologists associated fantasy
and daydreaming with psychopathology, Singer and colleagues
established that mind wandering is a normal, widespread, and
adaptive human phenomenon that occupies a signiﬁcant portion
of waking thought (Singer and Antrobus, 1963; Singer, 1966).
They also found that people are aware of daydreaming, can reli-
ably report it on questionnaires (Antrobus et al., 1967) and that
individuals differ in their daydreaming styles (Singer, 1974, 1975;
Segal et al., 1980; Huba et al., 1981; Huba and Tanaka, 1983).
INDIVIDUAL DIFFERENCES AND PERSONALITY
To illuminate individual differences in mind wandering ten-
dencies, Singer and Antrobus developed the IPI (Singer and
Antrobus, 1966, Revised 1970), a 344 item questionnaire prob-
ing such dimensions as daydream frequency, emotional content,
sexual content, visual imagery, acceptance, and distractibility
(Singer, 1975), followed by the SIPI (Huba et al., 1981; Huba
and Tanaka, 1983). Factor analysis of the two inventories revealed
three broad daydreaming styles: positive constructive daydream-
ing, guilty-dysphoric or guilty-fear-of-failure daydreaming, and poor
attentional control. The validity of these three factors has been
demonstrated repeatedly in the last 40 years across gender, ethnic-
ity, life span, and mental health status (Giambra, 1974, 1977, 1979,
1980, 1989).
As early as 1960, Singer had already begun exploring the rela-
tionship between mind wandering and personality traits (Singer
and Brown, 1960; Singer, 1961; Singer and McCraven, 1961, 1962;
Singer and Schonbar, 1961). Decades later, working with Zhiyan,
Singer found that the three styles of daydreaming identiﬁed in
the factor analysis are associated with distinct Big Five Person-
ality traits. Conﬁrming an idea that Singer ﬁrst explored in the
early 1960s, Zhiyan and Singer found that positive construc-
tive daydreaming was associated with Openness to Experience,
reﬂecting curiosity, sensitivity, and exploration of ideas, feelings,
and sensations. Poor Attentional Control was associated with low
levels of Conscientiousness while Guilty-Dysphoric daydreaming
correlated positively with neuroticism (Zhiyan and Singer, 1997).
MODERN APPROACHES
Many of the methodologies and tools Singer and Antrobus pio-
neered in the 1960s and 1970s are still in active use today, either
independently or in conjunction with brain imaging technolo-
gies. Most notably, Singer and Antrobus’ research foreshadowed
Klinger’s proposal of a baseline state of mentation to which
thought reverts in the absence of external demands (1971) and the
discovery of the default mode network (DMN; Andreasen et al.,
1995; Binder et al., 1999; Raichle et al., 2001) as well as its par-
tial anti-correlation (Fox et al., 2005) with the executive attention
network (EAN; Antrobus et al., 1966; Singer, 1966, 1974, 2009;
Antrobus, 1968, 1999; Singer and Salovey, 1999; Kaufman and
Singer, 2011). Although Singer and Antrobus lacked the brain
imaging technology that facilitated the discovery of the DMN,
they often remarked on the apparent competition between inter-
nally and externally produced information streams for limited
attentional resources (Singer, 1966; Antrobus, 1968). However,
they also recognized that the anti-correlation later described by
Fox et al. (2005) is only partial because the human mind processes
internal and external information streams both serially and, when
conditions are right, as with repetitive or overlearned tasks or in
familiar settings, in parallel (Singer, 1966, 1974, 2009; Antrobus,
1968; Antrobus et al., 1970).
SIGNAL DETECTION AND THOUGHT SAMPLING
Numerous recent studies have also employed signal detection or
thought sampling alone or in combination with brain imaging to
elucidate the respective roles of the DMN and the EAN in mind
wandering (Smallwood et al., 2005, 2007b, 2008a, 2012a; McKier-
nan et al., 2006; Kane et al., 2007;Mason et al., 2007; Christoff et al.,
2009; McVay and Kane, 2009, 2010, 2012a,b; McVay et al., 2009;
Andrews-Hanna et al., 2010; Killingsworth andGilbert, 2010; Kam
et al., 2011; Vanhaudenhuyse et al., 2011; Andrews-Hanna, 2012).
Mason et al. (2007) combined three methods pioneered by Singer
and Antrobus (thought sampling, ocular motility measurements
and the IPI) in their study of the role of the DMN in mind wan-
dering. After tabulatingVoxel correlations with study participant’s
scores on the daydream frequency scale of the IPI and a mea-
sure of eye movement frequency, they found that the incidence
of mind wandering, the magnitude of BOLD signals observed in
the DMN, and self-reported daydreaming frequency on the IPI
were all positively correlated. Thus, some 40 years after it was
ﬁrst introduced, the IPI was used to corroborate early evidence
showing a correlation betweenDMNactivation patterns andmind
wandering.
EYE MOVEMENT
Another of Singer and Antrobus’ methods still in widespread use
today is the measurement of eye movement in conjunction with
mind wandering. This method is particularly common in studies
examining the deleterious effects of mind wandering on read-
ing (Schooler et al., 2004; Smallwood et al., 2008a,b; Reichle et al.,
2010; Smilek et al., 2010). More recently, a number of studies
have expanded beyond Singer and Antrobus’ ocular motility mea-
surements to include measurements of pupil diameter (Einhäuser
et al., 2008, 2010). In 2011, Smallwood et al. (2011a) found that
pupil diameter serves as a reliable indicator of the decoupling of
attention from perceptual input during ofﬂine thought.
DECOUPLING
Over the last decade Smallwood, Schooler, and colleagues have
invested signiﬁcant energy investigating and reﬁning the hypoth-
esis ﬁrst put forward by Singer and Antrobus (Antrobus et al.,
1966; Singer, 1966; Antrobus, 1968) that mind wandering is asso-
ciated with the decoupling of attention from perceptual input
(Smallwood et al., 2003, 2008a, 2011a, 2012a,b). In the aggregate,
these studies provide robust support for the decoupling hypothe-
sis and Singer and Antrobus’ early observation that the incidence
of mind wandering decreases as task demands or performance
reward increase (Antrobus et al., 1966, 1970; Antrobus, 1968).
Most recently, Schooler et al. (2011) and Smallwood et al.
(2012a) have elaborated the decoupling hypothesis further, sug-
gesting that mind wandering consists of two core processes:
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perceptual decoupling and meta-awareness, the ability to take
explicit note of one’s thoughts. In a study that examines the limits
of perceptual decoupling, Kam et al. (2013) found that some atten-
tional functions are maintained during mind wandering, most
notably detection of unexpected changes in the environment.
COGNITIVE CONTROL FAILURE
The vast majority of the research conducted over the last two
decades portrays mind wandering as a cognitive control failure
(McVay and Kane, 2010), highlighting its ill effects on reading
comprehension, mood, memory, sustained attention, academic
performance, IQ, and SAT test performance, and task-related pro-
cessing (Teasdale et al., 1995; Smallwood et al., 2003, 2007a,b,c,
2008a,b, 2009a,b; Schooler et al., 2004; Kane et al., 2007; McVay
and Kane, 2009, 2010, 2012a,b; McVay et al., 2009; Reichle et al.,
2010; Smallwood and O’Connor, 2011; Mrazek et al., 2013).
In a recent review of the costs and beneﬁts of mind wan-
dering, Mooneyham and Schooler (2013) identiﬁed 29 studies
published since 1995 focused on the costs of mind wandering.
On the beneﬁts side of the ledger, they cited just six recent
studies or publications noting the functional beneﬁts of mind
wandering.
Why such a gross imbalance in the recent literature? We know,
not only from Singer’s work, but also from other studies that mind
wandering is a universal human experience, affecting each of us
countless times throughout the day (Klinger and Cox, 1987; Kane
et al., 2007; Killingsworth andGilbert, 2010). One large-scale study
conducted via web application and mobile phones reported that,
on average, mind wandering consumed 47% of the participants’
waking hours (Killingsworth and Gilbert, 2010). If the costs are
so great and the beneﬁts so scant, why do we spend so much of
our time daydreaming? Why does mind wandering persist despite
its costs? This question arises repeatedly throughout the literature
(Klinger, 1971, 1999; Mooneyham and Schooler, 2013). Could it
be that we are missing an important part of the story? While the
costs of mind wandering are apparent and easily quantiﬁable, the
beneﬁts seem less obvious and tangible. They require us to dig a bit
deeper.
POSITIVE CONSTRUCTIVE DAYDREAMING
Singer and colleagues report many of the costs associated with
mind wandering, yet the central theme of Singer’s large body of
work is the manifestly positive, adaptive role that daydreaming
plays in our daily lives (Singer, 1964b, 1966, 1974, 1975, 2009). We
turn now to the beneﬁts of daydreaming ﬁrst described by Singer,
then bolstered by recent studies exploring the adaptive role of the
DMN and mind wandering on cognition.
Right from the start, Singer’s research produced evidence
suggesting that daydreaming, imagination, and fantasy are
essential elements of a healthy, satisfying mental life (Singer,
1966; Antrobus, 1999). His early research included studies
looking at delayed gratiﬁcation (Singer, 1955) and the inter-
action of imagination and waiting ability in young children
(Singer, 1961). In another early study, Singer and Schonbar
(1961) presented evidence of correlation between daydream-
ing frequency, measures of creativity, and storytelling activity.
In the ﬁrst paper co-authored with Antrobus, Singer explored
the relationship between daydreaming, personality, divergent
thought, creativity, planning, problem solving, associational
ﬂuency, curiosity, attention, and distractibility (Singer and
Antrobus, 1963). Singer noted that daydreaming can reinforce
and enhance social skills (Singer, 1964b), offer relief from
boredom, provide opportunities for rehearsal and constructive
planning, and provide a ongoing source of pleasure (Singer,
1966). In later work, Singer describes those who engage in
positive constructive daydreaming as “happy daydreamers” who
enjoy fantasy, vivid imagery, the use of daydreaming for future
planning, and possess abundant interpersonal curiosity (Singer,
1974).
In a recent review, Schooler et al. (2011) suggested that positive
constructive daydreaming serves four broad adaptive functions:
Future planning which is increased by a period of self-reﬂection
and attenuated by an unhappy mood; creativity, especially cre-
ative incubation and problem solving; attentional cycling which
allows individuals to rotate through different information streams
to advance personally meaningful and external goals; and disha-
bituation which enhances learning by providing short breaks from
external tasks, thereby achieving distributed rather than massed
practice. All four functions are present in Singer’s work, though
his terminology differs.
ADAPTIVE VALUE
In the last decade, studies investigating the role of the DMN in
mind wandering bring the adaptive value of positive construc-
tive daydreaming clearly into focus. Wang et al. (2009) provided
evidence that the DMN activation and spontaneous thought
are associated with ofﬂine memory consolidation. Baird et al.
(2012) demonstrated that engaging in simple activities that per-
mit daydreaming can promote creative incubation and problem
solving.
Smallwood and colleagues undertook a series of studies explor-
ing the temporal dimensions of mindwandering (Smallwood et al.,
2009b, 2011b). Whereas previous research had established a link
betweennegativemood and retrospectivemindwandering (Small-
wood et al., 2005; Smallwood and O’Connor, 2011), these studies
reveal the adaptive beneﬁts of prospective daydreaming. Small-
wood et al. (2011b) found a strong link between self-reﬂection,
autobiographical memory and future-oriented off task thought,
suggesting all three cognitive processes are critical to our ability
to simulate events in the future. This ﬁnding is highly consis-
tent with Singer’s assertion that positive constructive daydreaming
allows us to plan for and rehearse possible future scenarios
(Singer, 1966).
In another study, Smallwood et al. (2013) investigated the
effect of mind wandering on delay discounting ﬁnding that self-
generated thought may contribute to the successful management
of long term goals. Both the topic and the ﬁndings of this
study echo some of Singer’s earliest work on the links between
daydreaming, delayed gratiﬁcation, and waiting behavior in young
children (Singer, 1955, 1961; McCraven et al., 1956).
Baird et al. (2011) considered how positive constructive day-
dreaming contributes to the anticipation and planning of person-
ally relevant future goals. They found that positive constructive
daydreaming tends to be future-oriented and that those with
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greater workingmemory assets aremore likely to engage in future-
oriented daydreaming. Thus, idle working memory resources are
essential to adaptive, prospective daydreaming. Whereas retro-
spective mind wandering tends to be loosely related to personal
goals, Baird et al. (2011) conclude that spontaneous prospective
thought is adaptive because it advances personally relevant goals.
This research clearly echoes and meaningfully extends Singer’s
work contrasting guilty-dysphoric daydreaming with positive
constructive daydreaming.
In their noteworthy review, Immordino-Yang et al. (2012) high-
light the value of “constructive internal reﬂection” for a wide range
of socioemotional skills including compassion, moral reason-
ing, simulating the perspective of another person, understanding
the implications of emotional responses, and deriving meaning
from events and experiences. They argue that by imposing high
attention demands on children in educational and other life con-
texts, we deprive them of the opportunity for the reﬂection that
enables them to make personal meaning from their experiences
and relationships. Once again, Singer’s work on the socioemo-
tional aspects of positive constructive daydreaming reverberates
in these ﬁndings.
While these studies focusing on the adaptive beneﬁts of mind
wandering may help to offset the dim view of mind wandering
that persists in much of the literature, they reveal only part of
the picture. We propose two areas of inquiry to expand our cur-
rent understanding of mind wandering: (1) Positive Constructive
Daydreaming can be volitional as well as unintentional and (2)
Positive Constructive Daydreaming appears costly primarily when
we measure it against external standards. Whereas the costs of
daydreaming may be public and visible, the beneﬁts are often pri-
vate and hidden. To reveal the beneﬁts of daydreaming, we must
ﬁrst identify an individual’s personally meaningful goals, aspira-
tions and dreams and then consider how daydreaming supports
or hinders realization of those goals.
VOLITIONAL DAYDREAMING
Throughout the literature, mind wandering is portrayed as a mis-
take, amentalmishap, a cognitive failure.What is seldomacknowl-
edged (with the exception of Christoff, 2012 and Smallwood,2013)
is that mind wandering can also be volitional. Individuals can
choose to disengage from external tasks, decoupling attention, in
order to pursue an internal stream of thought that they expect to
pay off in some way. The pay off may be immediate, coming in
the form of pleasing reverie, insight, or new synthesis of material,
or it may be more distant as in rehearsing upcoming scenarios
or projecting oneself forward in time to a desired outcome. Pro-
jection backward in time to reinterpret past experiences in light
of new information is also a possibility (Smallwood et al., 2009b,
2011b). All of these activities, which take place internally, shel-
tered from the demands of external tasks and perception, offer the
possibility of enormous personal reward. These mental activities
are, in fact, central to the task of meaning making, of develop-
ing and maintaining an understanding of oneself in the world
(Immordino-Yang et al., 2012).
Singer hinted at the possibility of volitional daydream-
ing saying, “Our human condition is such that we are for-
ever in the situation of deciding how much attention to
give to self-generated thought and how much to informa-
tion from the external social or physical environment” (Singer,
1993). Recent research revealing the involvement of the lat-
eral prefrontal cortex in mind wandering also suggests the
possibility of volitional mind wandering (Teasdale et al., 1995;
Gilbert et al., 2005; Christoff et al., 2009; Spreng et al., 2010;
Smallwood et al., 2012a).
Despite these hints, previous research tends to emphasize
the unintentional onset of mind wandering, suggesting that it
is automatically triggered by cues that may fall within or out-
side our conscious awareness (Klinger, 1971, 2009; Bonanno and
Singer, 1993; Giambra, 1995; McVay and Kane, 2010). The sug-
gestion seems to be that our minds wander against our best
wishes; that our drifting mind is beyond our control. Certainly
a large share of mind wandering occurs without permission
or awareness. But some mind wandering occurs because we
actively choose to decouple from external tasks and perceptions
and focus instead on an internal stream of thought with full
awareness both of the choice being made and the contents of
consciousness.
While everyone may be capable of such volitional daydream-
ing, the capacity to switch at will between inner and outer streams
of consciousness may be more fully developed in some than in
others. Extrapolating from Singer’s work with both Antrobus
and Zhiyan, we can easily imagine that this may be an area
in which individual differences come into play. It stands to
reason that positive constructive daydreamers, those who are
most open to experience and who consider daydreaming a pos-
itive experience, would be most likely to engage in volitional
daydreaming. On the other hand, those who experience mind
wandering as less or unpleasant would be less likely to engage
in volitional mind wandering. This latter group would include
ruminators and guilty-dysphoric daydreamers whom Singer and
Zhiyan found to show high levels of neuroticism and poor
attentional control daydreamers who tend to show low levels of
conscientiousness and have a hard time focusing on the internal
information stream or external task demands (Zhiyan and Singer,
1997).
It seems likely that the ability to engage in volitional daydream-
ing, i.e., to switch easily back and forth between different streams
of consciousness, might be sensitive to practice effects. Choos-
ing to disengage from external tasks, decouple, turn attention
inward, and follow an internal stream of thought with full aware-
ness undoubtedly requires skill. The process can break down in a
number of places along the way: at the decision point, decoupling,
the switch from outer to inner streams of consciousness, or meta-
awareness. But the more a person does it, the easier it is likely to
become.
Mind wandering, which occurs as a happy or unhappy acci-
dent for some, is consciously cultivated by others. Surprisingly,
it appears that no one has yet attempted to correlate frequency
of daydreaming with Singer’s three daydreaming styles. Research
has shown, however, that those who report more daydreaming
do, in fact, daydream more often (Antrobus et al., 1967). Hence,
frequent daydreamers, especially those who report positive con-
structive daydreaming, would be an obvious place to start the
search for volitional daydreaming.
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What neural architecture supports volitional daydreaming?
Most likely, volitional daydreaming involves the interaction of
multiple large-scale brain networks (Bressler and Menon, 2010).
For instance, Smallwood et al. (2012a) argue that the ability
to generate and sustain an internal train of thought is sup-
ported by cooperation between the EAN and the DMN (also
see Christoff et al., 2009). Another important player is most
certainly the salience network (SN), which includes the ante-
rior cingulate cortex, presupplementary motor area, and anterior
insulae. The SN is important for the dynamic and ﬂexible switch-
ing between the EAN and the DMN (Sridharan et al., 2008;
Bressler and Menon, 2010; Bonnelle et al., 2012). Since the
SN plays such a crucial role in signaling the need to change
streams of consciousness, an inability to activate the SN might
not only lead to difﬁculty with cognitive control (e.g., Bonnelle
et al., 2012), but may also limit the ability to access a posi-
tive and constructive inner stream of consciousness on demand
(Bonnelle et al., 2012).
Whatever the neural mechanisms involved, a deeper under-
standing of volitional positive constructive daydreaming can add
to our understanding of why mind wandering is so pervasive. But
there is more work to be done. It’s time to take a closer look at how
we calculate the costs and beneﬁts of mind wandering.
PERSONAL GOALS
As noted above, most recent studies depict mind wandering as
a costly cognitive failure with relatively few beneﬁts (Mooney-
ham and Schooler, 2013). This perspective makes sense when
mind wandering is observed by a third party and when costs
are measured against externally imposed standards such as speed
or accuracy of processing, reading ﬂuency or comprehension,
sustained attention, and other external metrics.
There is, however, another way of looking at mind wander-
ing, a personal perspective, if you will. For the individual, mind
wandering offers the possibility of very real, personal reward,
some immediate, some more distant. These reward include self-
awareness, creative incubation, improvisation and evaluation,
memory consolidation, autobiographical planning, goal driven
thought, future planning, retrieval of deeply personal memories,
reﬂective consideration of the meaning of events and experi-
ences, simulating the perspective of another person, evaluating
the implications of self and others’ emotional reactions, moral
reasoning, and reﬂective compassion (Singer and Schonbar, 1961;
Singer, 1964b; Singer, 1966, 1974, 1975, 1993, 2009; Wang et al.,
2009; Baars, 2010; Baird et al., 2011, 2012; Kaufman and Singer,
2011; Stawarczyk et al., 2011; Immordino-Yang et al., 2012; Kauf-
man, 2013). From this personal perspective, it is much easier
to understand why people are drawn to mind wandering and
willing to invest nearly 50% of their waking hours engaged
in it.
We mind wander, by choice or accident, because it produces
tangible reward when measured against goals and aspirations that
are personally meaningful. Having to reread a line of text three
times because our attention has drifted away matters very little if
that attention shift has allowed us to access a key insight, a precious
memory or make sense of a troubling event. Pausing to reﬂect in
the middle of telling a story is inconsequential if that pause allows
us to retrieve a distant memory that makes the story more evoca-
tive and compelling. Losing a couple of minutes because we drove
past our off ramp, is a minor inconvenience if the attention lapse
allowed us ﬁnally to understand why the boss was so upset by
something we said in last week’s meeting. Arriving home from the
store without the eggs that necessitated the trip is a mere annoy-
ance when weighed against coming to a decision to ask for a raise,
leave a job, or go back to school.
Some recent studies (Baird et al., 2011, 2012; Smallwood et al.,
2011b; Immordino-Yang et al., 2012) have provided glimpses
of how mind wandering or “constructive, internal reﬂection”
(Immordino-Yang et al., 2012) might beneﬁt the individual, but
we are just beginning to scratch the surface. To gain a fuller
understanding of the beneﬁts of positive constructive daydream-
ing we need to apply tools and metrics (as in Klinger et al., 1980;
Hoelscher et al., 1981; Nikles et al., 1998; Cox and Klinger, 2011;
Klinger and Cox, 2011) that enable us identify the personally
meaningful goals, aspirations, and dreams of individuals and
determine how mind wandering supports or undermines those
goals. Given the highly personal nature of mind wandering, we
need a new focus and new metrics.
INTELLIGENCE
Intelligence theories provide an interesting parallel. Traditional
theories of intelligence emphasize cognitive control, deliberate
planning, and decontextualized problem solving as the essence
of human intelligence (Kaufman, 2011). This is largely due to the
purpose of the ﬁrst intelligence test: to identify students in need
of alternative education. Because intelligence tests were designed
to predict school grades, the tests were intentionally designed to
measure the ability to proﬁt from explicit instruction, concentrate
on an external goal, and engage in abstract reasoning. Therefore
it should come as no surprise that IQ test performance is strongly
associated with activation of the EAN (e.g., Jung and Haier, 2007;
Barbey et al., 2012).
While the cognitive functions measured on traditional metrics
of intelligence are undoubtedly important contributors to intellec-
tual functioning, they are mostly decontextualized. Rarely are the
test takers allowed to dip into their inner stream of consciousness
and produce an original response that incorporates self-relevant
information. To help correct this imbalance in the literature,
Kaufman (2013) proposed the Developmental Theory of Personal
Intelligence. According to the theory, intelligence is the dynamic
interplay of engagement and ability over an extended period of
time in pursuit of personal goals (Kaufman, 2013). The empha-
sis is adaptation to task demands that are relevant to attaining
one’s personal goals, not just adaptation to the external goals dic-
tated by educators and experimental psychologists. Therefore, the
theory takes into account an individual’s personal goals, and con-
siders both controlled forms of cognition (e.g., working memory,
attentional focus, etc.) and spontaneous forms of cognition (e.g.,
intuition, affect, insight, implicit learning, latent inhibition, and
the spontaneous triggering of episodic memories and declarative
knowledge) are important potential contributors to that personal
adaptation.
This broadened conceptualization of human intelligence is in
line with the plethora of research we already reviewed in this
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paper on the adaptive value of positive constructive daydreaming.
Research shows that when daydreaming, the contents of con-
sciousness tend to be focused on upcoming personally meaningful
events, indicating that they may play a role in autobiographical
planning (Smallwood et al., 2009b; Morsella et al., 2010). In par-
ticular, Klinger (1999) showed that people’s daydreams and night
dreams reﬂect “current concerns” ranging from constant thought
of incomplete tasks to unresolved desires, ranging from sexual and
social strivings to altruistic or revenge urges and the panoply of
human motivations.
This deeply personal conceptualization of intelligence is
also in line with the latest research in cognitive neuroscience.
D’Argembeau et al. (2010) found that imagining personal future
events elicited stronger activation in two key hubs of the DMN –
the ventral medial prefrontal cortex (MPFC) and the posterior
cingulate cortex (PCC) – compared to imagining non-personal
future events. The researchers suggest that these brain areas
support a collection of mental processes that evaluate, code,
and contextualize the relevance of mental representations with
regard to personal goals. Since traditional measures of intel-
ligence do not allow individuals to imagine personal future
events, or connect the test information to their large store-
house of episodic memories, functioning of these key regions
of the DMN are ignored in the assessment of intellectual
functioning.
Another key implication is that sometimes behavior that
appears “unintelligent”measured by external standards may actu-
ally be quite intelligent as judged by its relevance to achieving
personally meaningful goals. Importantly, these different ways of
being “smart” can conﬂict with each other. According to the neu-
ral global workspace theory of consciousness, different streams of
consciousness compete for access to a global conscious workspace
(Baars, 1993). This may explain why the EAN and the DMN tend
to be anticorrelated (Fox et al., 2005). Daily life often demands that
we choose one information stream or the other. For instance, in a
decontextualized educational context, or in a cognitive psychology
experiment, the ability to concentrate on a task requires silencing
the inner chatter. Vice versa, when we would like to dip into our
inner stream of consciousness, we must block out our external
percepts (Dehaene and Changeux, 2005; Smallwood et al., 2011b;
Kam et al., 2013).
However, as Kam et al. (2013) point out, when the EAN works
in concert with the DMN to sustain an inner train of thought,
selective attention processes are not absent – they just are turned
inward to select the most relevant associations and ideas that
emerge from episodic memory. This has important implications,
because traditional views of selective attention erroneously assume
that the main function of the EAN is to select relevant stimuli
from the external environment for deliberate, conscious process-
ing. However, these traditional models miss a key feature of
human cognition: when working in cooperation with the DMN,
the EAN is equally equipped to select relevant episodic associa-
tions that can help keep an inner stream of thought both positive
and constructive.
CONCLUSION
Whatever aspect of mind wandering current researchers might
wish to pursue, it is likely that Singer considered the question ﬁrst
and made as thorough an investigation as the technology of the
day would allow. His research serves as a solid foundation and
springboard for all who come after him and share his fascination
with positive constructive daydreaming, mind wandering, and the
imaginative capabilities of the human mind. Our ﬁeld owes him
an enormous debt of gratitude and respect. We are happy to do
our small part to honor that debt.
In closing, we should note thatmuch of what we have presented
here ﬁrst emerged not from an intense period of methodical, laser-
like focus but from periods of diffuse inward focus in which our
minds were not merely permitted but willed to roam freely within
our respective mental landscapes. Thanks to nearly six decades of
Singer’s work, we were conﬁdent that was where our best and most
productive insights would be found.
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